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Abstract 
 
The environment has many of the properties that economists associate with the concept of a 
public good. It has long been realized that, if left to itself, the market economy is likely to lead 
to an undersupply of public goods and, in the environmental area, to an insufficient use of 
resources to preserve environmental quality. Economics research in this area has concentrated 
on three central issues. First, exactly why is it that a market economy fails to allocate 
resources efficiently in the presence of environmental public goods or externalities? Second, 
how can one assess the economic value of environmental goods? Second, what kinds of 
policy are best suited for the protection of the environment; e.g. should one rely on tax and 
price incentives or on quantitative regulations? The article discusses these questions and also 
describes the evolution of the economic perspective on the environment, from a concern with 
local problems to focus on international and global issues of environmental pollution. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The economics of the environment is the scientific study of the interaction between economic 
activity and the state of the environment. The issues studied in this area of economics may be 
local, national as well as global, and they may be related both to the natural and the man-made 
environment. As regards the natural environment, people may be concerned both by the air 
pollution created by the local chemical plant and by the national problems that stem from the 
activity of the whole chemical industry of the country. The negative effects on water quality 
from the use of fertilizers in agriculture can become political issues both at the local and 
national level. Internationally, we are all aware of the problems of global warming and the 
changes in the climate that may arise from the unregulated commercial exploitation of the 
tropical rain forest. 
 
Most people’s concern with environmental problems comes no doubt from their belief that 
environmental deterioration will reduce the quality of life, both their own and that of others. 
From this point of view it is not only the natural environment that is of importance but also 
the quality of our cultural or man-made environment. Traffic congestion, noise and 
dilapidated buildings have harmful consequences for the standard of living of city dwellers. 
People’s satisfaction with the society that they live in is to a large extent determined by the 
visual aspects of it, whether it is the cultural landscape of the countryside or the architecture 
of city streets. The resources devoted to preserving or improving the natural or cultural 
environment must necessarily compete with alternative uses of resources to produce other 
goods and services that are important for our standard of living. There is, as always, a need to 
strike a balance between alternative uses of productive resources in society.  
 
In earlier times it was common to refer to such concerns as non-economic. This is now widely 
regarded as a misguided point of view. Environmental values are also economic values. We 
spend resources on preserving them, and, at least implicitly, we compare environmental with 
more conventional economic values each time we decide whether some project of 
environmental improvement is worth the resources that we use on it, and which could have 
been used to produce other goods and services.  
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The increasing concern with environmental issues has affected research priorities in many 
academic disciplines, including economics. As a matter of fact, economics has a fa irly long 
tradition in the area. The English economist A. C. Pigou wrote about environmental problems 
with great insight in his 1920 book The Economics of Welfare (Pigou 1920), and created a 
theoretical frame of reference which is still recognizable in the literature.  The modern 
economics of the environment is now well established as an area of specialization with its 
own journals and research conferences. However, it should be stressed that the economics of 
the environment does not represent a fundamentally different approach to economic and 
social problems from that of economics in general. Environmental economics is simply the 
application of economic theory and empirical methodology to problems of the environment. 
 
In the following I shall mainly try to characterize the economic theory of the environment 
with emphasis on the implications of the theory for the design of environmental policy; a 
more extensive and technical survey of the theoretical literature is Sandmo (2000). 
Limitations of space and time prevent me from surveying the extensive empirical work that 
has been carried out in the area; here the reader is referred to Cropper and Oates (1992) and to 
the articles in the Handbook of Environmental Economics (Mäler and Vincent 2003). 
 
1. Private goods, public goods and market failure. 
 
A recurrent theme in economic theory since the time of Adam Smith has been to clarify the 
conditions under which a market economy will allocate resources in a socially efficient 
manner, i.e. without waste of resources. Waste is said to occur if it is possible to improve the 
welfare or standard of living for some individuals or groups without at the same time reducing 
it for others; conversely, social efficiency is said to prevail if such an improvement is not 
possible. A central result of economic theory is that competitive markets under certain 
assumptions will bring about social efficiency (also referred to as Pareto optimality). An 
intuitive interpretation of the result is that the price mechanism works as a channel of 
information between producers and consumers in the economy. On the one hand prices 
inform producers about the preferences of the consumers; on the other hand they convey 
information to consumers about the costs of production. When markets work so as to bring 
about a balance between demand and supply, prices lead to an adjustment of consumer 
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preferences to the economic resources of society. Firms will find it profitable to produce what 
consumers want, while consumers will adjust their consumption to the costs of production. 
 
This sounds like a pure apology for laissez-faire, but it is not. It is important to be aware that 
the result about the social efficiency of competitive markets holds only under a particular set 
of assumptions. I will not go into a full discussion of these assumptions, but will focus on one 
of them. 
 
The market mechanism applies to private goods, i.e. goods for which the total quantity 
consumed is the sum of the quantities consumed by all individuals in the economy. By 
contrast, the market economy is not well suited for the production of so-called public goods. 
For public goods, such as the national defence, there is no meaningful distinction between the 
individual and total “consumption” of the good; the defence provided for me protects you to 
exactly the same extent. Leaving the amount of defence services provided to voluntary 
contributions from market agents runs into the free rider problem; each agent is likely to 
contribute little or nothing to the provision of the public good, because he knows that if others 
contribute, he will in fact be able to benefit from the public good in any case. Since such 
goods will not normally be provided by the market, the responsibility for their provision has 
typically come to rest with the public sector. 
 
Environmental goods like the state of the climate, clean air, clean water, the absence of traffic 
congestion, and biological diversity, are other examples of public goods, but they are of a 
different kind than the example of national defence. Unlike defence, they are not produced by 
the authority of some public body. Instead, their availability is determined by countless 
decisions taken by individual consumers and firms regarding the use of fossil fuels for 
transportation and heating, car use and hunting activities. This means that individual decisions 
about production and consumption of private goods are tied to the production - usually in a 
negative sense - of public environmental goods. Environmental quality becomes a by-product 
of private decisions by market agents. This is what is known in the economic literature as 
externalities.   With the existence of externalities, individual incentives in the market 
economy will no longer lead to an efficient allocation of resources. This is an example of 
what is known as market failure. 
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I will illustrate this by a simple example of the choice between private and public 
transportation in a situation where there are congestion externalities. Mr. Smith has the choice 
between taking the bus to work and using his own car, and he makes his decision by weighing 
the pros and cons of each alternative. Buses and cars use the same roads, and it is assumed 
that initially there are no public regulations that influence the choice of transport. In the case 
of bus travel, there is both the cost of the ticket and the time cost to consider. In addition to 
the direct travel time, Smith has to take account of the time to walk from his home to the bus 
stop and from the end stop to his workplace. In the case of the car, the most important cost 
item may be the cost of petrol. There is of course a time cost involved here too, but that is 
likely to be less than is the case for the bus. Smith concludes that it pays him to take the car. 
Perhaps he takes the time to consider briefly the environmental consequences of his decision 
and whether these should not motivate him to take the bus instead. However, even if he does 
it is natural for him to reason along the following lines. “There are ten thousand cars on the 
road in the morning and afternoon rush hours. It is of no consequence for the speed of traffic, 
the level of noise or the emission of greenhouse gases if the number increases to ten thousand 
and one. Therefore, the environmental consequences are without importance for my choice of 
transportation.” We have to admit that in thinking along these lines Smith is perfectly rational 
from an individual point of view. The catch is only that if everyone thinks like him - and 
everyone is after all in the same situation - there will be so many cars on the road that 
everybody will be frustrated about the delays, the noise and the degree of air pollution. Will 
this give them an incentive to leave the car in the garage and take the bus instead?  
 
Let us take a closer look at the structure of incentives. Let us imagine that Smith converts all 
costs, including costs of time and inconvenience, into money, so that each choice that he 
makes can be characterized by a single number for costs. When thinking about the costs of car 
and bus travel, Smith realizes that the cost of his own choice will depend on the choices that 
the other travellers make. E.g., if he chooses to go by car, the cost will be less if the others go 
by bus than if they too travel by car. Thinking of “the others” as a simple aggregate, Smith 
must now consider four different outcomes, which may be summarized in the following table: 
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         The others’ choice 
 
      Bus   Car 
 
Bus  (40,40)  (100,80) 
 
Smith’s choice 
 
Car  (20,40)  (80,80) 
 
Table 1. The consequences of Smith’s transport decisions in terms of travel costs.  
 
 
The numbers in brackets are to be understood as Smith’s travel cost (the first number), and the 
travel cost of a representative member of the group of others (the second number). Thus, e.g., 
the parenthesis in the upper left corner means that if everyone takes the bus Smith and 
everyone else will incur a travel cost of 40 each. (The absolute values of the numbers are 
unimportant; it is their relative magnitudes that matter.) 
 
What will Smith do? It is clear that the travel cost that he incurs depends on what the others 
will do (I simplify by letting Smith think of the others as a homogeneous group, but the 
principles behind the analysis remain the same under more realistic conditions). A striking 
feature of the table is the following: Whatever the choice that the others make, it pays Smith 
to take his own car! If the others take the bus, he will be able to drive on un-congested roads. 
And if the others use their cars, there is no gain for Smith in being the only one who takes the 
bus; in fact, the bus will move even more slowly than the cars in the dense traffic. 
 
What will the others do? From the table it might look as if the cheapest alternative for them 
would be to take the bus, but that would be a misinterpretation. For the others do not in fact 
act in a coordinated manner; each one of them is like Smith and concludes like him that the 
individually rational solution is to take the car. The result - the equilibrium outcome - is that 
everyone takes the car with the resulting travel cost of 80, while they could have taken the bus 
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and cut their costs in half. Both Smith and the others may be enlightened enough to see that 
the outcome is collectively irrational, but none of them has any incentive to change his travel 
strategy independently of what the others do. This is a case of market failure, since individual 
decisions fail to realize a socially efficient use of resources, i.e. of the road facility and 
individuals’ time. 
 
This is a special example, so it is fair to ask whether it is of more general interest in an 
environmental perspective. The answer is yes, for there are a large number of examples with a 
similar structure. In the choice between heavy and light oil for heating each homeowner will 
have a strong incentive to choose the cheapest and most polluting alternative, even if he 
realizes that air quality will improve if homeowners as a group choose the less polluting 
alternative. Within agriculture there are many examples, especially in developing countries, of 
soil erosion that is due to farmers cutting down the woods to extend their land or provide fuel. 
In an international perspective we observe that countries are reluctant to impose regulations 
on the use of private cars, even though they know that car use generates a significant share of 
the world’s emission of greenhouse gases and may contribute importantly to global warming 
and climate change.  
 
2. The role of public policy. 
 
If the stylized example in the table were to be taken literally, it is fairly obvious what the 
government should do: Ban private cars! If this is done, there remains only one possible 
equilibrium, viz. the one where all travellers take the bus and aggregate transport costs are 
minimized.  But whether the primary environmental problem in the example is congestion, 
noise or greenhouse gas emissions, such a solution would, in the large majority of cases, be 
bad environmental policy. The table is based on the assumption that all individuals are alike, 
whereas in more realistic settings they are different individuals with heterogeneous needs and 
tastes and accordingly different costs for private and public transportation. Suppose that the 
government wishes to reduce private car use to 50 per cent of its present level. There are 
many ways in which this could be done. One is to let cars with odd plate numbers drive on 
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, while those with even numbers are allowed to drive on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. This is a form of rationing which has no connection with 
people’s needs and tastes and must be deemed socially inefficient, just like the total ban, 
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although to a smaller degree. (It also encourages families to acquire two cars, one with odd 
and one with even plate numbers, a striking example of resource waste.) 
 
In order to implement a more efficient solution to the problem, the government should aim to 
encourage those 50 per cent of the private car users to switch to bus travel to whom it would 
cost the least to do so. If we think back to the elements that enter into the calculation of travel 
costs in Table 1, it is clear that a number of these can be changed by public policy. The 
government can encourage increased use of public transport by introducing toll charges for 
private cars, increasing taxes on petrol, or subsidizing bus tickets. It could also influence the 
time costs in favour of public transport by introducing separate lanes for buses and less time-
consuming arrangements for ticket purchases. All these measures have the advantage that they 
encourage a switch to public transport for those whom it costs least to change their 
commuting patterns, so that the reduction of car travel is achieved in a socially cost-effective 
manner. The same is true about measures to control industrial emissions. Quantitative 
regulations provide no guarantee that emissions are reduced most where it is cheapest to do 
so. Charges on emissions face all polluters with the same gain from reducing pollution, and 
this implies that emissions will be reduced most in the firms where the cost of emission 
cutbacks is lowest. From the viewpoint of social efficiency, charges or taxes are in general 
preferable to quantitative regulations and quotas. 
 
An exception to this conclusion has to be made for transferable quotas. A reduction of CO2 
emissions can be achieved in an efficient manner by taxing emissions from all polluters at the 
same rate. An alternative is to introduce a quota system where polluters are allowed to trade 
quota units among themselves. If the number of polluters is large enough to allow the 
existence of a competitive market for quotas, the gain on the margin from a further reduction 
of emissions will be equal to the quota price, which is the same for all polluters. This leads to 
an allocation of emissions among polluters with the same efficiency property as the tax 
regime, viz. that the social cost of reducing pollution to any given level will be minimized. 
The initial allocation of the quotas among the polluters could be achieved by an auction 
whereby the government grants pollution rights to the highest bidders. Just like the tax 
solution, a system of transferable quotas would combine an efficient environmental policy 
with the creation of revenue for the government. 
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The government revenue from environmental taxes or pollution quotas has been widely 
discussed under the heading of “the double dividend” from a green tax reform. Most taxes, 
like indirect taxes and the income tax, have adverse effects on social efficiency. 
Environmental taxes are different in actually increasing the efficiency of the market 
mechanism. The government could now use the revenue from green taxes (or from the sale of 
quotas) to reduce the level of other taxes in the economy, thereby making the tax system as a 
whole more efficient, and this is the second dividend from the reform. This is an interesting 
idea which has been widely used as a “sales argument” for a green tax reform. Although on 
closer examination it turns out that the conclusion is not as obvious as it may seem - a lot 
depends on exactly how the rest of the tax system is supposed to change - a green tax reform 
clearly has the potential to result in a double dividend. Whatever one’s view of the realism of 
the double dividend idea, it needs to be kept in mind that the main benefit from environmental 
taxes is that they can be used to improve environmental quality in a manner which minimizes 
the cost of achieving the environmental target. 
 
3. Valuing environmental benefits. 
 
If the government is to implement a sensible environmental policy, it is not enough to know 
that some products or activities cause harm to the environment and that the harm can be 
reduced by the use of taxes and other policy instruments. Clearly, in addition to formal 
theoretical models we need to have quantitative information based on empirical data. We need 
to decide not only that the emissions should be reduced, but by how much it is sensible to 
reduce them. We also need to know not only that the emissions can be reduced by imposing 
taxes on them, but also how large the taxes will have to be. The most difficult issue concerns 
the estimation of environmental benefits. Cutting back air pollution carries a cost, so one must 
ask if the benefits are larger than the costs. As we have already argued, clean air is a public 
good, so this comes down to the question of how to estimate the benefits from public goods. 
In principle, we know how this should be done: Estimate the benefit to each single individual 
and take the sum across individuals, keeping in mind that an improved air quality benefits all 
individuals simultaneously. 
 
How can this be done in practice? An obvious solution is simply to ask people what their 
benefits are. In most cases it would be impractical to ask everybody, but one could employ the 
methods of survey research to poll a representative sample of individuals affected by the 
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pollution and use the results to arrive at an estimate for the whole population. A difficulty 
with this procedure is that it may not be in the private interest of individuals to answer the 
questions truthfully. Suppose that I am asked “How much is it worth to you to have air 
pollution in your area reduced by 50 per cent?” This form of the question makes no reference 
to the costs, and in particular not to the share of the cost that I personally will have to pay. If I 
assume that I will not in fact have to bear any of the cost, I might be tempted to overstate my 
benefit from reduced pollution, simply because I believe that this will increase the probability 
that something will be done about it. If, on the other hand, I believe that my own cost will be 
positively related to my stated benefit, I will be tempted to understate my preferences, hoping 
that others will report sufficiently high benefits that pollution will be reduced anyway (the 
free rider problem again). Many economists are therefore very sceptical to this method of 
assessing environmental benefits. 
 
Nevertheless, methods of this kind have been much used in practice under the name of 
contingent evaluation. Practitioners of the method have naturally been aware of the incentive 
problems that are associated with it and have tried to phrase the questions in such a way that 
respondents are encouraged to evaluate the benefits in a realistic setting as regards costs. 
Whether they have always been successful in obtaining these goals has been a matter of 
heated debate; some have also maintained that the method suffers from so many weaknesses 
that it is likely to be misleading even when used by skilled practitioners of survey research 
and interview methods; for a short survey of the issues see Portney (1994). Critics tend to 
prefer various types of indirect methods to that of contingent valuation. 
 
The indirect methods are based on attempts to trace peoples’ valuation of environmental 
goods through their observed market behaviour. In the case of local air pollution, one method 
would be to observe house prices in more or less polluted environments; the premium at 
which equivalent houses in unpolluted areas sell can then be taken as a measure of the 
willingness to pay for a cleaner environment. Another example is one described in Pigou 
(1920), where the benefits of reducing air pollution in Manchester was estimated by data for 
household expenditure on washing and cleaning in Manchester compared to the cleaner 
neighbouring city of Harrogate. The reduced expenditure on such items in Harrogate, as 
compared with Manchester, was then taken as a measure of households’ gains from reduced 
pollution. The strength of the indirect methods is that they do not run up against the problem 
of less than truthful reporting. Their weakness is that they often capture only part of the 
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benefits; thus, in the Manchester air pollution study, the method used did not capture the 
possible health benefits from cleaner air, nor did it capture the aesthetic gains from a clearer 
sky. The contingent valuation method, by contrast, asks for a full valuation of the benefits. 
 
A particular problem that comes up in the estimation of environmental benefits has to do with 
the time dimension of the problem. Many environmental problems involve significant 
investments or sacrifices of present benefits against other benefits that may stretch far into the 
future; think e.g. of the benefits and costs involved in preserving endangered species. How is 
one to compare costs and benefits that accrue over long intervals of time? The economist’s 
standard answer to such problems is to recommend that future benefits be discounted so as to 
obtain a present value to be compared to the costs. To illustrate, assume that somebody 
proposes an environmental protection project which will generate a benefit of one million 
euro per year from now to infinity, involving a present cost of 60 million euro. If one uses a 
discount rate of five per cent, the present value of the benefits is 50 million, so the project 
should be rejected. However, many people may feel that this is very short-sighted; what 
should be rejected, they say, is not the project, but the economists’ principle of discounting. 
But if we do that, the value of the project is infinite, and it should be carried out no matter 
how large the cost of the investment is. Obviously, this too is open to objection; in the 
absence of discounting, a project with an annual benefit of one euro and a cost of 100 million 
would be socially profitable. Various solutions to the dilemma have been proposed in the 
literature, some of which involve giving up the principle of discounting at a constant rate, 
substituting a method of a declining discount rate that discriminates less against projects with 
a long time horizon (Weitzman (2001)). However, this is an area where a professional 
consensus is still lacking. 
 
4. Changing perspectives. 
 
Both in the pure theory of externalities and in the literature of environmental economics, 
economists’ views on what the central problems are have been changing over time, especially 
over the last three decades. In the early literature on environmental problems, the issues 
considered were typically quite narrow, like local community problems with air and water 
pollution. Gradually the perspective changed to the national level, focusing on problems like 
the preservation of unspoilt nature in the face of threats from road construction and the 
development of hydroelectric power. In recent years the problems that most of all have caught 
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the public’s attention have been international and global problems associated with pollution of 
the oceans and the atmosphere. This last development is especially interesting, since it raises a 
whole new set of issues regarding economic policy. 
 
In the above discussion I took it for granted that there exists a political authority that could 
enforce environmental tax rates or regulations. Although the degree of enforcement is itself a 
political issue, the enforcement assumption is fairly realistic for local or national 
governments, but it is not a realistic assumption for the world as a whole. It may be desirable 
to reduce global emissions of carbon-dioxide (CO2), but there is no international body that has 
the authority to levy a tax on national polluters. An international agreement to limit the 
emission of greenhouse gases must therefore be based on the voluntary cooperation of 
national governments. Hopefully, national governments will come to see that they will all 
have to take responsibility for the state of the global environment, but one has also to be 
realistic enough to see that there is a problem of national incentives with regard to the 
attainment of global goals. Although all countries will have an interest in a better 
environment, they will also have an interest in minimizing their own contribution, sometimes 
for very good reasons like concern for the budget deficit, unemployment, regional 
development etc. The challenge for economists in policy design will then take on a new 
aspect; global environmental policy should be designed in such a way that it not only results 
in an improvement for the world as a whole, but for each individual country that is party to 
the policy agreement. How can this be done? 
 
As an example, take the case of a tax on sulphur dioxide which is mainly responsible for the 
acid rain problem. This has been the subject of some economic research that shows up the 
principles involved in an interesting manner (see Newbery (1990) and Mäler (1991)); 
although the empirical basis of these studies is now somewhat dated, they serve well as an 
illustration of the main issues of international environmental policy. These studies found the 
emissions of sulphur dioxide to be very unevenly distributed between the countries of Europe, 
with the same being true for the incidence of acid rain. Suppose that it were deemed desirable 
to reduce total emissions by x per cent. One way to achieve this would be to require that each 
country involved should reduce its own emissions by x per cent. However, this would in 
general be inefficient, since some countries could reduce their emissions at low marginal 
costs, while others would find it very expensive. A better policy would be to try to equalize 
the marginal cost of reducing emissions across countries, and this could be achieved by a 
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treaty that requires a uniform tax on polluters in all countries, to be collected by some 
international agency. For each country, the net outcome of such a policy could be computed 
as the value of the improved environment minus taxes paid. But the countries that were the 
largest emitters would then find that they would suffer a loss, while the countries who were 
mainly the recipients of other countries’ emissions would gain. The former group of countries 
would therefore be likely to be against the treaty, while the latter group would be in favour. 
To make the treaty work, one would have to ensure the voluntary participation of all, and 
especially the countries that were heavy emitters and polluters of other countries’ 
environments. 
 
One method by which to ensure voluntary participation might be to redistribute the tax 
revenue in such a way that the countries which would otherwise be losers by the agreement 
would come out with a net gain. Such a redistributive scheme would have to be constructed 
with some care so as not to neutralize the effects on individual polluters’ incentives. It is 
important to keep in mind the basic idea: If an environmental agreement leads to gains for the 
world as a whole, there must be a way to divide the gain between nations so that all come out 
as net gainers by the agreement. If this can be done, it makes it much simpler to agree on 
policies that are globally efficient in the sense of achieving environmental gains at a minimum 
of cost. For further discussions of the relationship between equity and efficiency in an 
international context, see Sandmo (2003a, 2003b). 
 
The international perspective is a challenging one for the analysis of economic policy. There 
has always been a debate within the economics profession about the extent to which economic 
advice should take account of what is politically feasible and realistic. The area of 
international environmental policy is one in which I believe that we have no choice. We have 
to take seriously the fact that proposals to improve the global environment have to be 
acceptable to all countries - or at least to a large majority - in order to lead to the desired 
results. 
 
5. Environmental issues and human motivation. 
 
The economic approach to social issues, including the problems of the environment, has been 
criticized from both within and from the outside of the economics profession, and much of the 
criticism has been concerned with the economic view of human motivation. It seems fitting to 
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close with some reflections on the nature of this criticism in relation to problems of the 
environment. 
 
One common view is that economic theory takes a too narrow view of the forces that motivate 
individuals in their “daily business of life”, which, according to Alfred Marshall (1890), was 
the subject matter of economics. Mr. Smith in the transportation example above chooses his 
mode of transportation according to his personal travel cost, not according to a broader view 
of what is good for society. It is clear that there are persons who try to act in such a way that 
their actions can serve as a role model for society; in fact I believe that the large majority of 
us occasionally act in a way that is inconsistent with a narrow view of what constitute our 
self- interest. But in many areas our incentives clearly are of the same kind as those facing 
Smith, and to act against our self- interest would simply mean that we incur significant costs in 
the form of money outlay and personal inconvenience without making a noticeable 
contribution to a better environment. Moreover, it is by taking this view of incentives that we 
are able to explain why in fact we have environmental problems in the first place; if we were 
to assume that everyone always acted for the common good, it would be difficult to explain 
social phenomena like traffic congestion, over- fishing or the threat of animal extinction. This 
does not imply that we should refrain from studying more complex notions of motivation, but 
we have to keep an eye on the real environmental problems that need exp lanation and policy 
intervention. 
 
While critics of the economists’ view of human motivation may be interpreted as saying that 
it is too cynical, their view of the motivation of politicians is frequently said to be too naïve. 
Economists’ policy advice is maintained to be based on the assumption that politicians always 
act for the common good, and if only economists tell them what a good policy looks like, they 
will immediately implement it. This criticism is in fact based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the relationship between normative and positive economic theories.  
 
In the discussion above I have suggested that environmental policy should try to achieve 
production efficiency; environmental goals should be achieved at a minimum cost to society. 
Production efficiency is derived from the premise that social efficiency or Pareto optimality is 
desirable. This is not a normative principle of the same type as the Ten Commandments; it is 
a contingent normative statement in the sense that if you accept the desirability of Pareto 
optimality, then you should strive to achieve production efficiency by e.g. preferring emission 
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taxes to non-transferable quotas. The economist obviously cannot tell politicians which values 
they should hold, but he can still point out that their choice of values has implications for the 
kind of policy instruments that they should use. 
 
It should be clear from this that the normative theory makes no claim to be a positive theory 
of political behaviour. In order to understand how politicians actually act in the environmental 
field, we clearly have to study their individual motivation like we study the motivation of 
individual consumers and firms. This is an interesting and worthwhile area of research, but it 
is no substitute for the normative approach. If one’s ambition is to contribute to enlightened 
discussion of one of the most important areas of economic policy in our time, one should 
clarify the nature of market failure, the policy options before us and the consequences that the 
choice between them is likely to have. To believe that politicians and administrators are likely 
to be interested in the economists’ contribution is not, I believe, a too naïve view of human 
motivation.  
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